In-house development of scheduling decision support systems: case study for scheduling semiconductor device test operations by Freed, Tali et al.
In-ho~se . development of scheduling decision support systems: 
case ~t~d.Y for scheduling semiconductor device test operations 
T. FREED  K. H. DOERR  and T. CHANG  
Most manufacturing processes can benefit from an automated scheduling system. 
However;: the design of a fast, computerised scheduling system that achieves 
high-quality results and requires minimal resources is a difficult undertaking. 
Efficient .. scheduling of a semiconductor device test facility requires an 
information system that provides good schedules quickly. Semiconductor device 
testing- is the last stage of the long semiconductor manufacturing process, and 
therefore. is subjected to customer service pressures. The cost of an off-the-shelf 
computerised scheduling system may he prohibitive for many companies. 
In addition, many companies are taken aback by other characteristics of 
ofT-the~shelf scheduling systems, such as code confidentiality, maintenance costs, 
and failure rates. We draw upon the literature and our field case to discuss some 
of the"trade-offs bet\',:een in-house development and off-the-shelf acquisition of 
software: We describe the in-house design and implementation of a scheduling 
decision :support system for one device test facility. Using lh~.: design and 
implementation process of this system as a case study, we discuss how one facility 
uses in-h~mse design of systems in a strategic way, as a competiliv~ l:apability. 
·' , 
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1. Introduction 
Many manufacturing processes may benefit from an automated scheduling system. 
However, the, design of a fast, computerised scheduling system that achieves 
high-quality results and requires minimal resources is a difficult undertaking. 
The cost of an 'off-the-shelf' computerised scheduling system may be prohibitive 
for many companies. In addition, in our experience many companies are taken aback 
by other characteristics of off-the-shelf scheduling systems, such as code 
confidentiality; maintenance costs, and failure rates. We will use the term 'off-the­
shelf throughout this article to refer to software that is purchased from a 
vendor, with the understanding that the user-interface, and to some limited extent 
 ·n d t be modified durint" implementa tio n. While 
the execution, of that sofware WI nede. o ·uch modific·ttion fs not truly oiT-thc-sh\!lf. 
ld -ugue that a system nee mg s < • • • 
some wou < f t . • scheduling systems. some customtsatwn ts 
we would argue that for m anu ac unng · 
always required. · t f ' l't · 'lltll·l.' · ·1n 
·- · h 1 li f a semiconductor dcv tce tcs act t Y 1~.: t..:s ' Ethctent sc el u ng o . · . 1 1• : ·, 
· - · h· t ,'des good schedules qu1ckly. Scnuconl uctor ( t.: \ tel:mtormatwn sys tem t a pro" I . . , . . . 
· · f th long semiconductor manufactunng pnx:L: ss. ,\fl(1testmg ts the last stage o c . , . , , , .· , . 
r · h' t d to custom,~1· service pressures. We dcscnhc the dt.:st gn .tn(.1 theretore IS su ~ec e '"' ·· . . . ·. .. . 
implementation of a scheduling decision support syste_m Ior a dcv.K~ t~.s~ ,t.\~llll y,' 
Using the design and implementation p~ocess of th_•s syst_c_m_ as ..1 <.:,'ts.t.:, st ut~)~ 
we further explore the potentia l benefits of m-housc destgn of sch~..:dulmg systt.:nb lot 
small to medium·size companies. . . 
The dcsion and development of the in·l10use system was completed 111 _tour 
months by a ~hree-person team, all full-time l:ompany crnployccs. The team conststcd 
of two industrial engineers and a process expert (past production manager~ ·-Sys_tcm 
implementation was completed in three month s. Up~radcs and mo~iJI tcattons 
requested by production m a nagement and worker·s contmucd to he performed hy 
one of the industrial engineers, who devoted approximately one day a week to 
the task . 
Shortly after implementation of the in·h ouse system, on- time dcliv..:ry ( the main 
manufacturing performance measure for the test facil ity) inc reased from 7 0'/~) to 
90% on average. Lot lead-times decreased by approximate ly 30<Yo . While this was 
not a controlled experiment, to our knowledge there were no other major changes 
in production or demand that would have explained this improvement. As detailed 
below, time and effort to create a daily schedule and to re-schedule the test facility 
\vere reduced significantly. 
The system had approximately 40 u sers, including both direct users and managers 
reviewing the schedule with various levels of education and process expertise. 
In order to accommodate the needs and computer skill levels of the various users, 
specia l efforts were made b y the developers to design a ' tra nsparent' , u ser- fri endly 
system. While no systematic d a ta were gathered on u ser percept ions of transparency 
or case-of-use, existing relationships between the developers and users o f the system 
facilitated open communications about usability issues: hy the end of the 
implementation process, there were no outstanding issues o r user requests related 
to usability. 
In-house development a nd execution had significant impact on organisational 
learning. In particular, using the system contributed to the organisa tio nal under­
standing of capacity issues anu scheduling tradeoffs. The reports generated hy the 
~ystem led to the identification o f problem areas, and to focused process 
Improvement efforts. The lon~er-term production planning process also benefitted 
from the mor~ a~curalc capactty estimates provided b y the system. 
The orgamsatton that owned o ur field site, Xilinx Inc., is a firm tha t ha s a culture 
which has supp~rted in-house development of operations software, as a competiti ve 
technology.. While other ~rms , ~specially hefore the 'tech bubble' hurst , invested 
large sums m off-the-shelf pla nnmg and scheduling a nd supply ct . · · · -.. · n
' f X ' ] ' . . 1(1111 0 p111111S.t1I0 
so t~are, t mx mvested not on~y m the scheduling system reported in this paper. 
but m the development of an m-house solutio11 l'or appl ' · · t · ( n ,. . . . . 1ca1IOn m cgratwn a 
mformauon bus), manufactunng execution system, planning system, and heavily 
   
customised a unique- competitive solution for forecasting. Beyond the rhetoric of 
vision and goals, iiwcstments must he made to support operational capabilities a 
ftrm wishes to develop for strategic advantage (Stalk et al. 1992). Xilinx invests in 
technically qualified personnel who can understand both software development, ami 
the manufacturing processes involved. Three of the Xilinx employees involved in the 
soft\varc projects just outlined held PhDs (two with degrees in Industrial Engineering 
from Berkeley, one· with a degree in Information Systems from Stanford). While 
advanced technical degrees may be common in research and development of firms 
such as Xilinx (which is, after all, a technology company), in our experience it is less 
common to find advanced technical degrees in the planning and manufacturing 
organisations. 
Semiconductor device testing is the last stage of the semiconductor manufactur­
ing process. At the Xilinx test Boor in San Jose, California, dozens of lots of 
semiconductor devices arc processed daily. Due to the level of competitiveness in this 
industry, efficient i1~d timely processing is crucial to the company's success. Before 
the system was implemented. the main test-floor performance measure, lot on-time 
delivery (fraction of lots completed by their due-date), was unacceptable- 75°/o on 
average. In addition, lot lead-times were prohibitively long. 
Historically, lot 'scheduling had been performed by the production manager. 
Due to the overwhelming volume of lot information and the level of uncertainty 
inherent to this m.:inufacturing environment, the scheduling task typically consumed 
more than half of-the production manager's time. The production manager was 
required to work seven days a week, since no one else was capable of developing a 
daily schedule. ·· 
Developing a better scheduling methodology for the test-floor \vas nece:::;sary. 
The main challenges of the new system were to increase average on-time delivery to 
90% and to decre.:ise average lot lead-time by at least 25%. The system had to he 
user friendly to people with limited computer experience (e.g. test-floor supervisors 
and workers), and provide solutions fast (\vithin minutes). so that a new schedule 
could be easily created when conditions changed (e.g. machine breakdown). 
After reviewing several commercial scheduling packages, a decision was made to 
develop the system in-house. A team of three full-time company employees 
(including the p~oduction manager/scheduler), designed and implemented the 
scheduling decisio; support system. 
The method applied in this paper is that of a case study, in its typical role of 
theory building (Lee 1999). However, we will not build a grand theory broadly 
addressing the question of software outsourcing. Rather, we will present a unique 
case that raises theoretical questions about what has been, to our mind, the 
overwhelming recent trend toward outsourcing software solutions. The first and 
third authors of :this paper helped conduct the reported review of commercial 
scheduling packages, and formed the core of the development team for the in-house 
solution. The second author worked for one of the commercial scheduling vendors 
being evaluated. Thus, this paper is not written in the typical logical positivi_st frame 
?f reference, but is rather written in an interpretivist frame, hy actors Involved 
ln the event, who ' are candidly advocates of the solution that was obtained. As 
~uch, it is conducted in the spirit of action research (Lev·.rin 1946) and app~eciative 
lnquiry. We belic~·c it has value for managers and researchers outstde our 
organisations because it provides (we hope) a vivid and thoughtful counter-example 
   
llscful l·n fttlLtrc til"orv building orto the recent trend to outsourcc, t l1at should be "' ­J 
decision making. - d t ·i "'Vice test pwcssIn the following sections we describe the semtcon uc o~ _c ~.: • ~.:. . 
. ~" ance goals We explain the dectswn to deYclop thethe schcd 1 · • .and u mg pertonn 
. h d . lea technical description or the system. The bend ti S nlthesystem m- ouse an prova_ , . . . 
· r1· ' ed including a testimonial of the Sentor Dm.:dor ol system arc t11en summa s , 
Operations. 
2. Process characteristics 
The semiconductor device test sub-process receives high visibility since it is th~: last 
stage of the semiconductor manufacturing process. From the test facility dc,·iccs arc 
shipped to customers and distribution centers, or transferred to linishcd goods 
inventory. A typical test-floor includes several processing operat ions: burn-in. 
electrical testing, marking/ branding, baking, programming, mechanical scanning. 
quality check and packaging, in this order (see figure I). 
The lesl-Ooor can be described as a flexible now-shop, i.e. the scqm:nc~ of 
processing operations is fixed, each lot requires a unique subset of the operations 
(burn-in, marking, baking, and programming may or may not be required). anJ 
multiple machines may be eligible for each operation. Since these mach ines may not 
be identical with respect to processing rates and/or output quality. there may h~ lot 
assignment preferences among the set of eligible machines for an operation (S.:c 
Leachman and Carmon (Freed) 1992 for further discussion on machine llcxibilitv). 
Yield and lead-time variability in previous stages of the manufacturing pnK~ss 
(i.e ., wafer fabrication and assembly- see figure 2) result in variable Jot sizes and lot 
priorities at the test sub-process. Yield loss at the test and scan opera tions may also 
be s ignificant and affect lot size and processing time at downstream operations. 
Lot priorities range from low priority lots to ' hot' lots that may justify pre-~mption 
of other lots. 
. ~achine failures are common a nd unpredictable . Preventive maint cnanc~ is 
st~mfica_nt, but cannot elimina te frequent breakdowns. Machines arc more likdv to 
fail dunng a changeover from one type of lot to a signilicantly different ;1nc. 
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Figure 1. T -st fl f c oor manu act uring process. 
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 Changeover durations are significant (same order of magnitude as lot processing 
durations), variable and sequence-dependent. For further discussion of the 
complexity of scheduling semiconductor device test operations the reader is referred 
to Uzsoy eta/. (1992a; 1994). to Carmon (Freed)(l995), and to Freed and Leachman 
(2001). 
Test-floor workers have various ski ll levels and skill sets. Some workers can 
operate subsets of the machines, and others can operate all machines hut subsets of 
product types. Labour cost is s ubstantia l (due to training time anti cost, as well as · 
skilled labour shortage), thus ski lled labour capacity constrains throughput. 
A worker may be assigned to operate two or more machines, therefore lost capacity 
due to machine interference is common. 
3. Performance goals 
Asemiconductor company would typically hold a la rge buffer inventory (Die Bank) 
between the wafer fabrication sub-process (front-end) and the assembly and test 
sub-process (back-end), in an attempt to absorb production fluctuations in the 
front-end and faciiitate produce-to-order in the back-end (sec fi gure 2). 
When transferred from Die Bank into the beginning of its assembly and test 
sub-process, each lot is assigned a due-date. By the due date the lot should complete 
the manufacturing process and either be shipped to its customer/distribution centre 
or transferred into finished goods inventory (FGI). The d uc date is determined based 
on the allowed assembly and test flow-time (also called lead-time or cycle-lime) for 
the lot. It is common practice to set the due-dates such that 95% of the lots are 
expected to achieve the goal of on-time delivery. In an effort to continuously 
improve, allowed . flow-times are decreased once the 95% OTD goal has been 
achieved. 
The test facility is typically concerned with three goals: 
1. 	Maximising on-time delivery (OTD), measured as the fraction of lots shipped 
or transferred to FGT before midnight of their due-date (maximising OTD is 
practically equivalent to minimising the number of tardy lots). 
2. 	 Minimising cycle-time, measured as the number of days from the beginning of 
the assembly process to shipping or transfer to FGI. 
3. 	 Maximising tester utilisatio n, since the testers are the most capital-intensive 
machines and the process' typical bottleneck. 
The OTD performance of make-to-order lots is important for customer 
satisfaction. Maximising OTD of make-to-stock lots is partially overlapping with 
minimising the mean and variance of the cycle-time, which, in turn can lead to 
increased sales and inventory reduction. The equipment utilisation performance 
measure is a'n indirect measure of facility throughput and manufacturing cost. 
Due to dynamic changes in market conditions, customer requirements, corporate 
financial goals, . and other business objectives cont1icts among performance 
measures are common (e.g. OTD versus utilisation) and must be balanced. The 
scheduling system must be flexible enough to accommodate multiple, time-varying 
objectives. 
 4. Scheduling methods in the semiconductor industry 
Some semiconductor companies u sc scheduling modules that ar~ part of their 
manufacturing execution system (MES). Other firms usc commerciaL stand-~1 lone 
scheduling systems. Yet others use software written in-hou~e; and as m~nttoncd 
earlier the authors have also seen firms where the production manager or other 
highly ,qualified personnel perform the scheduling tc.~sk manually. For:_tcst sched_uling 
solution techniques the reader is referred to the senes of papers by Carmon (l · rccd) 
(1995), Chen et a!. (1995), H errmann et al. (1995), Lee et al. (1993), Uzsoy ct a/. 
(1993), Ovacik and Uzsoy (1992, 1994a, 1994b, 1995, 1996), and to the pap~rs by 
Uzsoy et al. (1991), Uzsoy et al. (1992b), Chen and Hsia (1997), Dcmirkol and Uzsoy 
(1997), Xiong and Zhou (1998) and Freed and Leachman (200 I) . 
There are substantial differences in process characteristics among semiconductor 
manufacturers. For example, some companies test only at room tempera turc. while 
others must track temperatures and environmental conditions. Therefore. comma­
cially available scheduling systems h ave generic functionality that is greater than the 
need s of any specific application. Generic systems a lso requi re signilirant 
customisation to each application. Due to the inherent complexity of the process, 
scheduling solutions are typically achieved using heuristic algorithms or s imulation. 
Based on the software survey conducted as a part of this study (summaris~d hl..'iow). 
and based on the experience of the second author (\vho was employed h y a major 
scheduling software vendor a t the time of this study), a typical scheduling system or 
module for a semiconductor company costs hundreds of thousands of dollars 
upfront, and a substantia l additional cost for customisation. Over the life of a 
scheduling system maintena nce costs are of similar order of mal!nit ude. Most 
vendors would not release the code to their customers, so cust;misa lion anc.l 
maintenance must typically be contracted to the original system vendor. who thus has 
a potential conflict of interest in terms or developing robust, easy-to-maintain code. 
5. Make-or-buy decision 
The fa~tors used to e~aluate the make or buy decision at Xilinx arc grouped into 
ca tegones and ~hown ~n table 1. The categories are explained in more ~lctail hdow. 
and the evaluat1on of m-house versus off-the-shelf software is di~cusscd in terms of 
each factor. 

Obviously, the factors listed in table 1 · b · · · · · 

, k ' ( d are amena lc to a mult1-cntcna decision ~dhi~g me m) tool such a~ the analytical hierarchy process (Saaty 1994). While 
sue an approach \'·:as constdered in th d ( · 
suffic iently clear that the u sc o f at; e en a _s we will show) the choice w:IS 
f . b mcdm tool was deemed unncccs~n ry H ·td the 
op 1ons een more equa lly valued or if tl ·h . · • · ' . 
off th, h lf ' lC c Oice had to be made bet ween sinulaf 
- c-s e systems, an mcdm tool would have proved useful. . 
6. Operational efficiency and effectiveness 
The test-floor manufacturing environm t . . . 

conflicting obJ'ectives A recent en ts complex, fa st-ch angmg, and suhl·cct to 

· survey of b · ~ " · 
usmcss process managers found those 
 Tab.I~)· Factors affecting the make or buy decision. 
I. Operational _cfficicncy and effectiveness 
1.1 Source code availability 
l.l.a Timeliness of modifications 
1.1.b Control of logic/ algorithms (compditivc consideration) 
1.2 Integration with other systems 
2. Organisation<il learning 
2.1 Gained expertise of process now and complexities 
2.2 Likelihood of yielding process improvements 
2.3 Likeli,h_c)Qd of spurring development of other innovative systems 
3. Cost , .--. 
3.1 Developmcnt;acquisition 
3.2 lmple.mcntation 
3.3 Present value of annual maintenance 
managers believe : that in-house systems lead to superior process performance 
compared to ofT-the-shelf systems (Downing et al. 2003). In the case of scheduling 
systems, this may ~ · be because the level of customisation required of a generic 
scheduling system· is very high if the system is to be accurate enough to provide 
reasonable solutions. In fact, the customisation effort in this case was estimated to be 
similar to designing a completely customised system, tailored to the Xilinx test-floor 
needs. · 
Most commercial scheduling systems provide solutions to the scheduling 
problem, and are · not designed as decision support systems. In our experience, 
vendors arc reluctant to release information about the algorithms used, and the 
quality of a scheduling solution provided by software may sometimes be inferior to 
that of a manual solution provided by the company's scheduling expert. Take, for 
example, a case of scheduling a particular customer order knowing that a previous 
order for this customer was delayed. The importance of on time delivery for this 
particular custo.mer order may be higher than normal. However, special treatment of 
this particular order is impossible to ]ncorporatc in any of the solution algorithms we 
examined. Some ·or the software providers incorporate sophisticated user interfaces 
to facilitate after-the-fact modifications of solutions to allow users to account for 
such unmodelled considerations (Schneeweiss and Wetterauer 2005). But after-the­
fact modifications, ':however good the user interface, are not the same as building 
solutions in a flexible, interactive way. The second author remembers saying in a 
wondering tone at one meeting: 'You expect people to pay $400,000 so that they can 
tell you what their. schedule should be?' 
There is a range of applications here, from simple closed-Loop presentation of 
a canned solution :.which cannot be modified, through dynamic algorithms that 
~an account for· changing situations within a limited modelling framework, to fully 
Interactive support systems which provide recommendations, along with a 
transparent set of-reasoning, and allow for modification and interaction as the 
schedule is being built (Godin 1978, McKay et a/. 1988, Glassy 1991). While after­
the-fact modification is an improvement on the flexibility of batch scheduling, it is 
still short of fully interactive scheduling. Since the algorithms are not understood and 
cannot be improved•by the users, it may be difficult for users to understand how to 
modify them after the fact. 
  
. · · v the importance of users' input to guide the solution. vendors or ~nmeR ccogntsm-'=' . . . . . \ 
of the 'high-end' scheduling software we evaluated allow the mput of pnon\y w~1g ~ts 
to optimisation criteria (e.g. tardiness, minimising setups). The tran_sparcncy ol a_ 
system is known to influence the degree to which a human sche.dukr l~e~s a sense ol 
direct controL and is seen as a key design factor of schcdulmg <.kctsiOn support 
systems (Wier~ 1997, 2001). Allowing users to input priority weights m.ay bc .tlwught 
to provide some sense of control without transparency. But as the wa~ 111 wh1ch_ these 
weights are applied is opaque (sometimes to the employees ()!. the St)l_twar~_ 
company), such adjustments have little more value than the psychologtcal comfort nl 
'doing something' to try to guide the expensive software to a less na"ivc solution: and 
that psychological comfort may be quickly lost if the new schedules the softwar~ 
proposes are not in fact better. 
Xilinx considered its scheduling system to be a potentia\ smm.:e nf cnmpetiti\'e 
advantage, and hence the make-or-buy decision needed to rclkct strategic as well as 
tactical implications. Firms such as Wal*ma rt (cross-docking). Fed-Ex (in-transit 
visibility) and SCNF (scheduling; Ben-Khedher ct a/. 199X) han~ demonstrated 
how software can be used to support strategic business process capa bilitit:s. J\n 
off-the-shelf scheduling solution, available to any competitor might not put Xilinx al 
a competitive disadvantage, but would forego an opportunity to create a proprietary 
competitive advantage through improved scheduling. 
In a survey of several manufacturing organisations facing makc-or-huy d~<.:isions. 
Buchowicz (1991) found that firms which couched the makc-or-huv decision 111 
strategic, competitive terms tended to develop in-house. while firms tl~at purchased 
off-the-shelf software tended to be dominated by professional values. and to be more 
concerned with peer approval and the need to have a 'pseudo-rational' justification. 
\Vhile there are undoubtedly circumstances where the competitive adv.anta!.!CS that 
mi~ht be ~btained from in-house development are outweighed by the polcn;ial cost 
savmgs ot an off-the-~helf acquisition, we do not believe that those competitive 
advantages should be tgnored. 
Xilinx \Vas concerned about the unstable environment in which a scheduling 
svstem would have to operate Freque 1t . l • · · · 
. - . . · I prouuct Innovations. process and madunc 
mnovatJOns, and chan~mg customer priorities might each result in a need for 
chancres to software Jocrtc In such · .· · · · · 
. e . .o · · an environment code ava!lab1ltty rnttdlt h~ \crY 
Important to the tunelmess of modificat· ·· M · · -~ · 
. . . . . 1 IOns. oreovcr, as tlmclmcss of prod uctiOil 
IS an Important cornpchtlve cons'd t' . h · · 
, , h . . . 1 era lon, ~t sc cdulmg tool that hcavilv a fleets 
v. 11ct er 01ders are on ttme 1s a competitive tool. • 
The scheduling system designjsl ·t t . · · , 
. t d'fi __ . tppoi eam must also be av:IJiahlc and llcx!l-,]t:for fas mo 11c<tt1ons. It has been o · . · 
users as well as op~ t ... ur expenence that dcslgn team availahility to the 
, , enness o cntlctsm and m0 d·fi ., · . ._1 1 1usefulness The relat' h. b cattons. 1clp detcrmmc the sys tems 
. Ions tp etween the desi n t , . d . ­
management support of tl d . f g cam ..tn the users. as well ,ts1e estgn e forts m· . · 1 1 
success of the design and ·m ~ . ' ..ty practtca ly make-or-break t 1c1 1
. . P cmentat10n process 
A~ Xthnx, employee turnover was low .. ~ . . 
associated consultancies we wer . ' whtlc tn the software houses and 
. c eva1uatmg turno , . ,.. .1 · ­
typical for that industry) quite h . h '. . :c: ..tppcMcu to be (as 1s perlWP' 
knowledge would be garnered du ~g · ht1 was ,.tntlctpatcd that important process 
. nng t e devdopnP t . d . 1 . . I ~ 
schcdulmg system. And while tl . . · en .tn Imp cmcn tat1on ol Iw1ere IS no guarantee tl , t tl . l ' . . . 
sueh knowledge might remain ac, .bl ( ': 1,1 1e 111t tvtd uals acqu1nng7 
ceSSl e Ctthcr w·th x·J· )1 1 mx. or a sortware vendor 
  
the relative base rates (that is, relative turnover between Xilinx and the software 
vendors) were a so"urce of concern and a decision factor. 
Thus, we felt' that on the criteria of operational efficiency and effectiveness, 
in tenns of timeliness of modifications a nd control of the logic and algorithms, an 
in-house development was superior. While integration with some future off-the-shelf 
enterprise system was a concern, at tha t time Xilinx was also pursuing an 'open 
architecture' data-bus solution for enterprise system inter-operability, and we felt 
that a schcduling·system developed in-house would be just as easily integra ted into 
that architecture as an off-the-shelf system. 
....-;:-. 
7. Organisation,al learning 
Although it may seem that the trend in software is heavily toward outsourcing and 
inter-organisatiorial·,rclationships to foster learning (Holmqvist 2004), and that an 
acquisition of outside experience in the form of software might foster better learning 
outcomes, the reality, of organisalional lea rning is more complex. lt may also seem 
that internal projects would be an exploitation of resources, whi le external 
acquisitions would 'be an explora tion o f new potential. However, the reality appears 
to be that the t\vo -kinds of learning (organisational and inter-organisational) are 
interwoven, and that exploratory learning happens with in ternal projects as well 
(Holmqvist 2004)::, Much of the experience in scheduling software is coded into 
algorithms, which ·.vendors often claim as proprietary information. While there is 
undoubtedly learning to be gained by the elaboration of business processes needed to 
implement a scheduling software package, much of that learning may occur whether 
an organisation is ·implementi ng off-the-shelf or in-house software. Some of the 
business process learning in an off-the-shelf implementatio n nows from the customer 
to the vendor. Ofcourse, the argument can be made (by software vendors) that they 
have exposure to a broad range of firms in roughly the same line of business, and 
that they can bring knowledge of 'best practice' to their clients. While we have 
no data to argue-this point ei the r way, we would like to point out that the fact that 
a software fi rm 'may have acquired knowledge of best practice of the industry 
~rom ;other finns'. tends to support our point that the knowledge transfer can be 
tn the other direction. 
Hence, some firms maintain an in-house capability for software development at 
least in part because of considerations of organisational learning. Chrysler, for 
example, considers, software projects an essential part of its 'knowledge factory' 
(Landes et a/. 1999); and while organisational learning is only one part of good 
knowledge management, it is a necessary part. 
The kinds of learning that can take place in such development projects have been 
categorised as either model-building, or model-maintenance learning (Zhong and 
~fajchrzak 2004). Model-building learning is clearly the more important, as it 
~nvolves adaptin'g" to new knowledge. a nd building new conceptual structures that are 
unportant in generating further process innovations out of a development project. 
Some amount of model-building learning can take place in the customisation of an 
otT-the-shelf system~ However, the kind of in-depth discussion or cognitive 
elaboration (Zhong and Majchrzak 2004) of algorithm~ and proees.scs ~ce?ed to 
foster model-building knowledge from an off-the-shelf lmplem L:nta twn ts ta r less 
 · s f . . tors_ as alreadv noted arc reluctant to share the detailshkcly to occur. o Lware vent . , - . ' . . , .. , . . 
· h d · d d the1·r representatives workmg w1lh the dH.:nts m,1yof a 1gont ms, an 111 ee · .. thems~lves lack a deep understanding of those algorithm~. In addltJon the ve~1dors 
incentive in implementing their system is not to garner an -~~-depth und~rsta~H.lmg of 
the client's processes (which might require a useful cogmttvc claho~at1on _1 rom the 
customer) but simply to satisfy the customer that the system ·works as qutckly and 
cheaply as possible. . ,.. 
The pool of industrial engineering and process cxperttsc at ~lin:x was alsn. an 
important factor \vhen considering the relative impact on or~amsatwnal karnmg. 
Learning is the acquisition of knowledge; and knowledge. hkc wealth. may best 
accrue to those that already have an existing fund and facility to mak~ usc of it. 
There is evidem:c that firms with extensive existing knO\vlcdge in the problem donmn 
more readily undertake software process innovations within that domain. and the 
learning that result from them (Fichman and Kemerer 1997). 
Finally, as \Ve will discuss in more detail in the next section on cost. many oil-the­
shelf packages contain implicit assumptions about business processes that arc 
different from the ones a company currently follows, and hence have information 
requirements and outputs that do not at first appear to he within the limited scope of 
the system requirements that first prompted a firm to seck a software solution. In the 
case of enterprise resource planning software, it is common to hear that a firm must 
adapt its business practices to suit those of the softwan.: (Austin e/ a/. 1999). This is 
often defended as a benefit, because 'best practices' business process assumptions arc 
imbedded in the software. Hence, modifying the finn's business proccses is seen as a 
form of organisational learning. Ironically, however, studies of software l'irms 
indicate that they themselves arc reluctant to adopt software that requires a process 
innovation, at least in part because of the recognition that existing business proc~sscs 
reflect_ strategic, competitive priorities and that a change in those processes may 
necessttate a change in competitive strategy (Rifkin 2001 ). 
In sum, \-Ve decided that one of the most important benefits of an in-house 
dcvelo~ment at Xilinx would be the expert knowledge that would be spread among 
the dcs1gn team memhers, as well as the user group. We hoped that this expertise 
would later benefit the com11any by be· · d · · t 
. . . . mg mcorporatc mto process 1mprovemcn
mthatlVes and development of oth · d · · er computense systems, smcc the dcsu!n team 
members were company en1ployees I - t h' ~ 11 
_ · n I e rospect, t 1s proved to he the case. as a 
hut one of the er~ployees mvolved with this effort were still employed hv XilinX 
five years after It started and th • h d ­
· . . : ej a used the knowlcdl!c !..!aincd in the 
lmp1ementatwn descnhcd m this . r 1 ~ ~ 
'" . . ar lC e to generate other systems includin!! a 
cctpactty ana1ysts system_ • ~ 
8. Cost 
We note at the outset of our cost com . , 

evaluating all had many capab·l·t· .panson that the oft-the-shelf systems we were 

~ 1 I Ies Ill excess of x·1· ' · · · x
could not use Thus it would b 1 mx reqUirements. that X1hn 
· ' e expected that t1 · · · r
than the development cost of , . lc acquisition cost might be gn:ate 
. · a system tailored to XT ' · ·c1 111might seck to somehow value that t f . . x reqUirements, and that w 
Xilinx' shop floor might 'gro\v int~~ ~~e unctt~nahty, against the possibility that 
requirement. However. as Thelen <t110 
  
Morrison (1993) pointed out. these additional features also add cost. Those authors 
evaluated nine off-the-shelf software packages for job-shop scheduling, and fou nd 
that none were as good as an in-house system, primarily because of the supcrilous 
features offered, and the cost of gathering and maintaining the superfluous 
information needed to run them. 
Cost comparison of vendor versus in-house development of a scheduling system 
can be divided into the three phases of the project, namely design. implementation 
and maintenance. 
The design of a scheduling system requires industrial engineering/opera tions 
research (lEfOR, hereafter) expertise, programming expertise, and process experti se. 
Process expertise ·can typically be found in the form of one or more senior/long-term 
company employees. The time and dedication (and, therefore, cost) of these 
employees are necessary in the design and implementation phases, regardless of 
whether the system is developed in-house or acquired off-the-shelf (and customised). 
While in our evaluations, the estimated time required from process experts varied 
considerably depending on the vendor, the time estimates were not significantly 
lower for ofT-thc~shclfimplcmentations, and indeed were sometimes higher. But it is 
important to note that the tradeoff here is between time spent sharing knowledge 
with another empi?y~c . (and hence distributing corporate knuwledg~ vvithin the 
organisation) and time spent sharing knowledge outside the organisation. (Of course, 
when a firm lacks st~te-of-thc-art process expertise, knowledge may transfer from the 
vendor to the process experts as we1l, but at least in the case of Xilinx and the 
vendors in question~ the process knowledge transfer from the vendor to the company 
was deemed to be negligible.) The cost of lE/OR and programming expertise is 
substantial in both cases. A company must compare the cost of acquiring the 
expertise in the forin of employing the necessary personnel, to the cost of purchasing 
the expertise from·:·~l ~cndor. Of course, in some firms, the relative scarcity of the 
labour in question 1(programming and/or process expertise) might drive the decision 
to outsource, beyond a simple labour cost calculation. 
For the development of our in-house system, the project leader had a doctorate 
in industrial engineering and programming expertise. Another induslrial engineer 
with similar backgro~nd was added, and the process expert who completed the 
team had programming expertise as well. We felt that a significant amount of 
time would be required from this team whether the development was in-house, 
or off-the-shelf. While certainly some design time would be eliminated by using 
an off-the-shelf system, our sen se was that the time required to get our team at 
Xilinx fully up to ..speed on the off-the-shelf designs would be approximately the 
~arne (depending on the vendor) as the time required to gather specifications for an 
m-housc developm~nt, since our team at Xilinx already had a great deal 
of familiarity with the process. In our cost comparisons (see table 2) we thus 
only included the incremental time tha t would be required to actually program the 
in-house system. . 
The availability of process expertise is crucial for implementation and 
maintenance in' such projects. In this case the process was best known to the 
?roduction manager, who had been providing the schedules to t~e test-floor he w~s 
In c_harge of for several years . This expert's co-operation w~s mvaluable, a nd hts 
dedication was a necessary condition to designing the system m~house. \Ve felt that 
the amount of his time that would be required for implementatiOn would probably 
   
Cost comparison, 2005 d ollars.Table 2. 
Average off-thc-sh..:l f 
(lo\v. : l\nagc. high) In-house 
Development stag~ $64 200 (S205 000. S32 120ll . S..\OlH)(lO) 
Implementation 
$72 300 (S 145 000. S2..t0 900. S-'~5000) 
~aintenance 
Annual 
PV (5 years, 10%) 
Lifecycle cost 
$ 16 100 
$61000 
S l97 500 
($ 14 000. S-Hi .:::!00. $ (J) OllO) 
SI X2 700 
S7..t..t XOO 
be less with an in-house development, as the development team wol_tld at least hcur 
to speed on the basics of the p roduction process, and much ~)I the _Jxnducuon 
terminology used by Xilinx. To be conserva tive, howev~r, we dtd n~H ttH::_Iudc the 
additional cost of the production manager's time in the tmplcmcntatton ol the niT­
the-shelf system. The implementatjon cost for the off-the shelf systems repr~sc nt ~ an 
average estimate from vendors and related consulting groups. Th~ tn -housc 
implementation cost was calculated from the fully-burdened salary o l the ot_hcr 
two team memhers (not the production manage r) and an est imate of the tnnc 
required to train users. 
The maintenance costs of the system, as a percentage of the acq uisition cost 
seemed very attractive from the off-the-shelf vendors, but we did not think that 
percentage represented a fair estimate of Xilinx maintenance costs. The nat 
percentage ignored the time organic personnel would need to unde rs tand the 
maintenance issue, codify it, and find a work around until the system could he li xcd 
or enhanced. Moreover, while some of the softwa re vendor's mai ntcna nee lahou r 
might be spread across multiple customers (and hence be less than the la bour 
required for an in-house development) , most of tha t was only programming time. As 
all but one of the vendors we spoke to seemed to have relatively small customer hascs 
(even software firms with relatively high visibility had fewer than a dozen worki ng 
implementations), we were also unsure of the degree to whiL:h thei r economics of 
scale would outweigh the m arkup they would necessarily expect to receive o n their 
programmers' time. We felt that the fixed-percentage maintenance contrac t merelY 
obscured these underlying economics, as in the short run the sofhvarc vendor would 
have the optio n of lowering their service costs in some way (delayed or degraded 
service) if maintenance expectations outstripped the nominal fcc. In the end, we 
decided tha t most of the o rganic cost required for maintenance (analysis and 
workaround) would he similar regardless of where the software was developed, and 
included only the t!m: we t~ought represented a reasonable level of p rogramming 
support and analysts tor an m-house solution. 
Five software vendors were evaluated for potential solution quality, companY 
reliability and e_xpertise. Wha t is shown in table 2 is a n average, high and low of 
those costs. \Vh1le so~e vendors had lower costs, the average is a good indication of 
the tradeoff between tn-house development and off-the-shelf acquisition. 
 Finally, we recognised that our in-house estimates for development and 
maintenance were more subjective. and more variable than the price quotes offered 
by vendors. We also realised that implementation expense, whether off-the-shelf or 
in-house, might vary substantially from the estimates. In such circumstances, a risk 
analysis, using Monte-Carlo .simulation to gauge the probability that in-house costs 
might exceed off-the-shelf costs can he useful. Ho\vcvcr, given the magnitude of the 
cost differences between the alternatives, and the fact that in-house development 
seemed superior on all of the qualitative facLors, we did not feel that a risk analysis 
was necessary. 
In the end, it was estimated that a decision-support system (DSS) tailored to 
Xilinx' specific application would be simpler, faster, more effective and less expensive 
than a generic, solution-providing system supplied by a vendor. 
As noted above, one day per week was hudgeted for ongoing support of this 
system, and that proved sufficient (as judged by lack of user complaints about 
response to support requests). While someone had to wear a beeper to be on-call for 
support, coverage across shifts also appeared to be adequate (again, based on lack of 
complaints). Detailed data were not kept on maintenance costs, but the initial 
estimate was used to derive the budgeted time for maintenance, and that budget was 
not changed in four years after the implementation of the system. 
9. Technical description of the system developed in-house 
The system developed in-house was called The Dispatcher. It was designed to be 
a user-friendly DSS. not a solution-providing, closed-loop (i.e. non-interactive) 
scheduling system. 
The main requirements from the system \Vere as follows: 
• 	 Determine and display lot processing requirements and urgency. 
• 	 Provide an efficient v,:ay to assign lots to resources and to sequence them for 
each resource. 
• 	 Provide an erticient way to re-schedule in the event of machine breakdown. 
• 	 Provide sorting mechanisms for various performance measures. 
• 	 Provide and maintain process modeling accuracy and data accuracy. 
• 	 Provide data to user rapidly (run in less than five minutes). 
The Dispatcher is an Excel-VBA-based decision support system. The main 
advantages of using Excel are the familiarity of most users with it, and the ease of 
data manipulation. It is meant to be used in an interactive fashion, displaying data 
inputs to a decision· in an effective way, and giving prompt feedback ahout the 
~ttality of proposed decisions. The human decision maker remains a central part of 
Implementation, but the need for expert scheduler knowledge is reduced, as some of 
the expert knowledge is built into the system (McKay and Wiers 2004). 
Using macros, cell calculations, and Visual Basic code, The Dispatcher takes the 
current WIP data and sorts it based on due-date and processing requirements. 
The system gcner~tes a separate priority list for each of the five main test-floor 
Processing steps, namely Test, Mark, Bake, Scan, and Visual Inspection. The 
scheduler then makes the assignment (to one of several similar or identical resources) 
and sequencing decisions. Next, the scheduler provides the production manager with 
 the schedule for each resource. Feedback from the manager may result in schedule 
modification. The final schedule is then provided to the operators and to the visual 
inspectors on paper and on their computer works tations. Rescheduling can be 
performed off-line by the scheduler or the manager. and the new schcduk is then 
provided to the operators. 
The Dispatcher starts by downloading the current Wl P data Ilk and deleting all 
the unnecessary information. Since the device identification number (DIN) contains 
most of the info rmation pertaining to the lot processing requirements. the DIN is 
then p<Jrsed to its components. Based on the DIN and other lot attributes. th~ lots 
are sorted. Some lots a re sent to the 'Non-Dispatched' page. These lots may ha\·c 
quality problems, require special processing, or should he kept in inventory until a 
customer order dictates their processing characteristics (sec Brown cr a/. 2000). \1ost 
lots are sent to the 'Main' p age to be dispatched. 
ln the "Main' page the attributes of each lot arc used to dctcrmin~ the n.:maining 
processing steps required. A look-up table is u sed to determine the pr~fcm.:d 
equipment type for the lot at each process step, and con!->eq uently the estimated 
processing duration of the lot. Lot changeover time is then calculated, as wdl as the 
lot's critical ratio (CR) , as follows: 
CR = (Due date- Present time) 
R emaining processing time· 
Based on the C R, lots a rc placed in one of five critical ratio groups (CRGs}: 
CRG1 for lots \vith CR < 0 (already tardy); 
CRG2 for lots with 0 =< CR < 1 (will become tardy}: 
CRG3 for lots with 1 =< CR 2 (.l. t · d. · 
< • no tmme - tately processed \VIII become tardv): 
CRG4 for lots with 2 = < CR < 4 (medium urgency}; . 
CRG5 for lots with 4 =< CR (non-urgent}. 
Lots whose CR < 2 arc e ither tard · · 
thus highlight d t · ·r y, or r~qmre urgent processing. These lots are 
e , o stgm y tha t they requ11.,. -. • . . 
Processing of lot 1 , CR · ~ specia1 attention. i\lthoul!h urgents w lOse . < 1 actually h t, th OT ~ ~ 
these lots are alreadv 1· t d . ur s e D performance measure (since 
- a e, an processmg the d 1 . . · perceived necessarv for gen . . m e ays proccssmg of other lots) 1t tS1Wh . 1. . era c ustomer satisfaction and goodwill 
. en a new ot requires several ro . · . . · . 
tts earliest arrival time to ea h t t ces~Ing steps, The Dispatcher estimates 
The Dispa tcher provides estim~tc~ ;i~ enoof-:a~t). For lots at upstream opcrat~on s.1by summing up the expect d h rnval (ETA) to downstream operauonsl 
e c angeover and · · downstream operations Alth h processmg ttmcs prior to t 1e 
· · oug these ETA ·­
practice allows the operators to sctu e . s ~ay not be accurate, tht:-. 
urgent lo ts. P qmpmcnt m advance for processing of 
The Dispatcher also performs stat· . 
· 1c capac1ty 1 1 · · r
requirements are summed fo r each CRG ca cu attons. The total capactt) 
easily compare the capacity rc . on each type of resource. The scheduler can 
·r quuements to th ., b'J· to
management 1 action must be taken d · . e avm a 1 1ty, and report 
ue to large dtscrepencies. 
I 
 As an Excel program, The Dispatcher accomodates various sorting algorithms. 
Therefore, switch!ng the system from sorting based on one performance measures to 
another is simple; 
During the -~evelopment of The Dispatcher much emphasis \vas placed on the 
accuracy of pro.ce·ss modeling. Clearly, the system designers wished to ereate a model 
of the test-floc~ that would perfectly imitate the real test-floor. 1\ccdlcss to say, 
mainly due to,incompleteness of information and instability of the test-floor and its 
operating procedures, designing a complete model capturing every nuance 
that affects scheduling decisions is an impossible task. The trade-off between 
model accuracy and programming effort was considered numerous times during 
the design, and inclusion/exclusion decisions were made frequently. For example, 
lots of devices that require rework are rare, and cannot be easily distinguished 
from lots of new devices. The programming effort required to obtain the 
information needed for this distinction from the manufacturing execution system 
database was substantial. Rework processing time is typically slightly shorter 
than the processing time of a new lot. Therefore, it was decided that the slight 
difference in duration and the rarity of rework lots did not justify the extra 
programming effort. 
It was relatively simple to guarantee the accuracy of the data retrieved from the 
manufacturing'~~ecution system database. It was more complicated to maintain the 
accuracy of data in the internal lookup tables. Engineering developments frequently 
result in new· d~vices, as well as reduction of processing and changeover times. 
Modifications '~f The Dispatcher lookup tables must be coded with every such 
change. Therefore, procedures that guaranteed transfer of such information from the 
engineering department to the manufacturing department were put in place. 
To insure update, the maintainer of the dispatcher was added to the signature list 
for approved design changes. This table modification is done within the budgeted 
one day per week of maintenance. 
The simplicity of The Dispatcher keeps its run time shorter than five minutes. 
The scheduler.. fypically prepares a daily schedule in about an hour. Rescheduling 
is typically performed once or twice daily, and would typically be completed 
in 30 minutes (including the time to enter information about, e.g. machine 
breakdowns, etc.). 
__, 
10. Conclusions 
,..\ .. 
The Dispatchei'was still in use four years after its implementation. By then, several 
vendor produ~ts evaluated as an alternative to The Dispatcher were no longer 
available. A schedule for the test-floor was created daily using the system, 
production supervisers used the system to reschedule in the event of machine 
?reakdown, and test-floor operators used The Dispatcher routinely to. obtain 
Information pertaining to their schedule and to the urgency of the opcratwns for 
which they were responsible. The performance improvements due to The Dispatcher 
are summarised in table 3. 
The Dispat~her was only a small-sc~le ~uccess story at _Xilinx. ~m~ll-scale, 
because it required a relatively small capital mvestment, and 1ts contnbutwn was 
limited to improving the San-Jose test-floor performance. Xilinx subcontracts 
   
. t d to new schedulinl! system . Performance tmprovemen ue · ~Table 3. 
Organisational
Oircct and tangible 
On-time-delivery increased 
from 70% to 90% 
Lot lead time reduced by 30% 
Understanding of capacity issues led to. 
development of better capacity planmng. 
svstcm . . 
Better relationships and cummumcatton 
among operations, planning. and shop-floor 
Acquired process knowl~d~~ l~J to scn:ral 
process improvement lllltlattvcs . 
Easier, tnore effective management ol the 
production floor 
the majority of its testing to vendors who use their own scheduling methods. 
The obvious contribution of The Dispatcher was, therefore. local. On-time 
delivery of the San-Jose facility increased from 70% to 90'X~ o.n avcr<~ge. and 
Jot lca.d-Limcs decreased by approximately 30°/ o. Time and sktll rcq utrcm~nts 
to create a daily schedule for the test-floor were reduced significantly. as ddatlcd 
above. 
Other contributions of The Dispatcher were perhaps more significant. although 
intangible. Through the use of The Dispatcher, the extent of the company's 
overloading policies and their consequences were better understood. The company 
was then able to usc the process data collected for the design of The Dispatcher to 
develop a capacity analysis system of the entire cotnpany's manufacturing 
operations. In addition to the dissemination of process expertise dcscrihcd above 
better relationships were formed between various groups who relied on hcttcr data to 
reach operational decisions. For example, disputes as to the cause of throughput 
problems could be discussed between the operations and planning group, referring to 
the hard data of what had been scheduled, and how the schedule had been modified. 
(Similar results may have been obtained with a vendor provided solution, we are 
merely pointing out that the result did not require a vt:ndor provided solution.) 
Better relationships were also established between the system's developers ami its 
users. These rehttionships later led to several successful process-improvement 
initiatives. In summary, the in-house development effort and the associated 
analysis, provided critical learning, knowledge and relationship-building for the 
re-engineering of the process. 
This article, in addition to reporting on the contributions made by The 
Dispatcher at Xilinx, has also added to the literature on make-or-buy decisions ror 
manufacturing soft.ware, by providing what we hope is a compelling example of i:l 
?rm ~hat ~as u~ed m-housc development as a core capability. Clearly each situation 
IS .~mque m th1s :egard, and we have already noted many of the unique factors at 
~tim~ that c~ntnbu~ed to our decision to develop an in-house system. A complete 
hst of _these factors 1s presented in table 4. However, we think our framework ~111d 
analysts of the pro?lem may .be useful for other corporations facing similar decisions. 
or researchers trymg to bmld a more generic framework. While some thcoreticHl 
 Table 4. Factors contributing to success of new scheduling system. 
Scheduling specific Organisational 
In-house availability of . 
scheduling expertise · 
Availability of program.ining 
expertise 
Availability of process. 
expertise 
Atmosphere supporting in-house 
developments 
Open-architecture of information system 
allowing integration of systems developed 
in-house 
Low employee turnover leading to stability 
of design and maintenance expertise 
Good relationship between system design 
team and system users 
Top management support 
Lmv on-time-delivery performance crisis: 
reduces barriers to change 
Perceptton of greater flexibility: that an 
in-house system would be more 
accommodating of modifications 
work has appeared -~~cently (e.g. Downing et al. 2003) there is clearly a great deal of 
work remaining. We think our paper helps in the development of a more general 
understanding of ~ake-or-buy issues for manufacturing software. 
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